

# The Opposition in Poland

By Adam Bromke

**P**oland has always occupied a special place among the Communist countries because of the scope of its internal freedom. For the more than 30 years that it has existed, the Communist government there has failed not only to establish its legitimacy in the eyes of many Poles but also to extinguish all traces of opposition. Indeed, when faced with workers' revolts in Poznan in 1956 and in Gdansk and Szczecin in 1970, the authorities retreated before popular pressure.

Again, in June 1976, when the workers in Ursus and Radom took to the streets in protest against food price increases, the Communist government hastily withdrew the objectionable measures. This time, however, popular ferment did not stop there. The "June events," as the Poles call them, produced a chain reaction which led to the emergence of a fundamentally new political situation in the country.<sup>1</sup> Opposition, which in the past had been largely passive and scattered, has now become active—it has taken an organized, vocal, and increasingly influential political form.

## A Shattered Modus Vivendi

Between 1956 and the mid-1970's, a subtle modus vivendi existed in relations between the Com-

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munist regime and various opposition groups. This was based on mutual acceptance of the country's difficult international position. Both sides, although for different reasons, wanted to avoid direct Soviet intervention in Poland. For the Communists, such intervention would have meant even further curtailment of their domestic authority; and for opposition elements, it would likely have entailed drastic restriction of what modest freedoms they in fact enjoyed. The compact was never overtly spelled out, but its essential rules were well understood and generally respected by both sides. In exchange for the Communist authorities' exercise of a modicum of moderation, opposition groups abstained from challenging the regime outright. Indeed, the major confrontations during this period were entirely spontaneous and narrowly focused attacks on specific policies. The workers' outbursts stemmed from sheer desperation over their economic plight, and the peasants' stubborn and largely successful resistance against the collectivization of agriculture was instinctive.

The Catholic church also avoided unnecessary confrontations with the Communist government. Continued mass adherence of the population to the Catholic religion—rooted in long national tradition—made the church a powerful organized force in the country. However, it conceived its role as largely confined to spiritual, moral, and at most cultural spheres, and only rarely, usually at a time of major crisis, did it take a stand on political issues. Although the church steadfastly defended the principles of freedom of conscience and respect for human dignity, its position, as articulated by its venerable leader, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, was

1. Political developments in Poland since June 1976 are reviewed in the author's "Poland at the Crossroads," *The World Today* (London), April 1978.

## The Opposition in Poland

generally moderate. Indeed, in 1956 and again in 1970, when there was a danger that the escalation of domestic conflict might lead to Soviet intervention, Cardinal Wyszyński appealed to the Poles for calm and restraint.

During the period, the most articulate criticisms of Communist policies came from the intellectuals. The writers, scholars, and artists did not constitute an organized group, but through their frequent interactions, particularly in Warsaw, they formed a closely-knit milieu. As a matter both of principle and of fashion, in a sort of inverted snobbery, they strove to manifest their reservations about the Communist regime. These they punctuated by public protests against selected government measures. Generally, they denounced the restrictions on cultural freedom, but they also condemned some especially flagrant abuses of human rights. The intellectuals' proposals for reforms, however, stayed within the limits of the Communist system, for they were resigned to the fact that it could not be changed. Moreover, their criticisms were often constrained by their own pasts: most had been leftists, and many also had formerly been members of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). Of particular importance, the anticlericalism of many intellectuals prevented them from establishing solidarity with the Catholic church.<sup>2</sup>

In the mid-1970's, the overall political situation in Poland changed dramatically as a result of a number of factors. To begin with, the opposition became emboldened by the improvement in East-West relations and by the example of Soviet dissidents' use of détente as a protective umbrella for their activities. In the eyes of many Poles, the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe reduced the chances that the USSR would intervene in their country as it had in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Carter Administration's early pronouncements about human rights heartened them as well.

More important were the consequences of the coming-of-age of the postwar generation in Poland. Free of the defeatist memories of World War II, these younger people are impatient with their fathers' passive resistance to communism. They are no longer satisfied with the solution of "a little stabilization"—seeking refuge in private life and re-

stricting one's interests to personal welfare—which was prevalent among the old generation in the 1950's and into the 1960's. The ferment among the youth first became evident in 1968 during the widespread student riots, in Warsaw and some other university cities, against restrictions on cultural freedom. In 1970, a clandestine group of young people who smuggled political literature from the West through the Tatra Mountains (and were hence dubbed the "Alpinists") was discovered and tried. In 1971, there were several trials of members of another underground group called Ruch (The Movement), with most of the defendants being under 30 years old.

Finally, the Gierek regime itself, through its mistakes, helped the opposition consolidate its forces and come out into the open. Intoxicated with its relative successes in the early 1970's,<sup>3</sup> the PUWP in 1974 abandoned its generally moderate stance and launched an open "ideological offensive," intensifying pressures on both the Catholic church and the intellectuals. The next year, despite signs of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, the party proposed amendments to the Polish Constitution that would bring the document closer to the Soviet model. These proposed changes were regarded by the opposition as a violation of the implicit compact between it and the government. The result was a deluge of formal protests, signed by some 40,000 people in all, including many prominent intellectuals.<sup>4</sup> The Catholic Episcopate and Cardinal Wyszyński personally threw their great authority behind the opposition. Under popular pressure, the party modified the most controversial constitutional amendments, but the harm to the Communist regime had already been done.<sup>5</sup> Its

3. The situation in Poland in the early stages of the Gierek regime was reviewed in the author's "Poland Under Gierek: A New Political Style," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1972, and in Adam Bromke and John W. Strong, Eds., *Gierek's Poland*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1973. For an assessment of the economic picture see Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland Under Gierek: A New Economic Approach," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1972; Zbigniew M. Fallenbushl, "The Polish Economy in the 1970s," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post-Helsinki*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1977. On the activities of the opposition, see Peter Raine, *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954-1977*, London, Poets and Painters Press, 1978.

4. Jacek Kuron, "Thoughts on the Program of Action," in *Ruch oporu* (The Resistance Movement), Paris, Institut Littéraire, 1977, p. 198.

5. The conflict over constitutional amendments is dealt with in the author's "A New Juncture in Poland," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1976. See also, Alexandra Kwiatkowska and Georges H. Mond, "Strife to the East," *La Documentation française* (Paris), Sept. 9, 1977, pp. 8-11.

2. For a critique of the leftist intellectuals' negative attitude toward the Catholic church in the 1960's, written by a young leftist leader of the opposition, see Adam Michnik, *Kościół, lewica, dialog* (The Church, the Left, the Dialogue), Paris, Institut Littéraire, 1977.



Prominent figures in the Committee for Defense of the Workers (KOR): from left to right, Professor Edward Lipinski, novelist Jerzy Andrzejewski, literary historian Jan Jozef Lipski, and historian Antoni Macierewicz.

—First two photos from Camera Press and EUPRA; last two provided through arrangement of the author.

prestige was seriously undermined, and from then on opposition activities snowballed. In May 1976, a new clandestine group appeared, calling itself the Polish Coalition for Independence (PPN). Its manifesto, circulated in *samizdat* form, called for restoration of democracy in the country and for Poland's independence from the USSR.<sup>6</sup>

An open break between the opposition and the Communist regime soon ensued. When, following the Ursus and Radom demonstrations in June, the Communist authorities resorted to widespread persecutions of the workers involved, the intellectuals promptly rallied to the workers' defense. In July 1976, a prominent writer, Jerzy Andrzejewski, praised the persecuted workers as "fighters for true socialist democracy" and pledged to persevere in efforts on their behalf.<sup>7</sup> To this end, on September 27, 1976, a Committee for Defense of the Workers (KOR) was established.

### Committee for Defense of the Workers

The composition of KOR reflected the various layers of opposition in Poland. Among its members (14 originally and 31 as of this writing), there are several prominent prewar social democrats such as Professor Edward Lipinski, a respected economist, and Antoni Pajdak, one of the defendants in the

trial of the Polish leaders in Moscow in 1945. They are all now in their 70's or even 80's. Another group is composed of well-known members of the wartime resistance movement. The youngest of these is a literary historian, Jan Jozef Lipski, who is now in his early 50's. But the largest, and also the most active, group in KOR consists of leaders of the 1968 student movement. Except for a former teacher, Jacek Kuron, who is in his 40's, these people are all in their early 30's or late 20's. The most widely known among them is a talented historian, Adam Michnik, who spent several months in Western Europe in 1976-77. Less known abroad, but no less influential, is another historian, Antoni Macierewicz, who, together with several of his friends and very much in the Polish tradition, joined the opposition ranks after having been active in the Boy Scouts movement in Warsaw.

A good many of KOR's supporters are student activists of 1968. Some of these have been members of Communist youth organizations or come from families with Communist ties. They still consider themselves leftists, or even Marxists, but of a more Western, Eurocommunist, or even social democratic brand. Others, such as the former "Alpinists," simply regard themselves as democrats. A relatively large group of the young activists are devoted Catholics, who continue to participate in official lay activities of the church. As a group, these young men and women, by now more mature and experienced than they were a decade ago and often hardened by years of imprisonment, are grimly determined to carry on their struggle for freedom.

6. See "The Declaration of the Polish Coalition for Independence," in *Ruch oporu*, pp. 187-93.

7. See *Aneks* (London), No. 12, 1976, pp. 43-44.

KOR's initial aims were modest. Its first communiqués, issued in *samizdat* form, reported on the persecutions of the imprisoned workers—with detailed accounts of police brutality—and announced a public campaign to raise funds for medical and legal aid. Gradually, however, the Committee's goals grew more ambitious. They came to include amnesty for all the imprisoned workers and their reinstatement in the same positions they had held before June 1976, plus punishment of those police officers guilty of abusing their powers. On January 16, 1977, KOR appealed to the Polish parliament (the Sejm) to appoint a special committee to investigate charges of beating and torturing of prisoners.<sup>8</sup> Eventually, KOR's activities broadened further and involved assistance to a variety of in-



Candles and flowers at an impromptu shrine at the Krakow apartment of student Stanislaw Pyjas, a supporter of the Committee for Defense of the Workers who was found dead on May 7, 1977.

—SYGMA.

dividuals persecuted by the authorities.

The Committee has developed quite ingenious methods for its activities. It has declared itself to be not a *political*, but merely a *social*, body. To avoid submitting itself to public control by the Communist authorities, it has refrained from adopting a formal organizational structure. It has operated simply as a group of citizens spontaneously cooperating to promote common goals. All of the Committee's activities have been conducted openly, but, naturally, some of them, especially the publishing and distributing of the *samizdat* materials, have been carried on more discreetly than others.

KOR offers moral encouragement, legal advice, and financial aid to the politically persecuted. For this purpose, money has been collected all over the country. However, the major vehicles of KOR's influence have been the communiqués, declarations, and appeals circulated throughout the country in *samizdat* form. It has regularly published its own paper, the *Buletin informacyjny* (Information Bulletin), named, significantly, after an influential organ of the Polish wartime resistance.<sup>9</sup>

Around these activities, KOR has built an impressive popular following. By the summer of 1978, there were official Committee representatives in nine cities, and active KOR supporters in many other centers. The Committee's demand for the establishment of a parliamentary committee to investigate police abuses was supported by close to 2,000 people, among them many distinguished intellectuals.<sup>10</sup> Cardinal Wyszynski, in several sermons, threw his enormous prestige behind KOR. Although refraining from directly endorsing the Committee's political goals, he made it clear that he fully supported its activities on behalf of the persecuted workers.<sup>11</sup>

The government's initial reaction to KOR's activities was mixed. On the one hand, a systematic campaign of vilification of the Committee was mounted in the press. The members of KOR were characterized as enemies of the socialist system in Poland and as collaborators of Western anticommunist centers. Several Committee members were dismissed from their jobs. Many others became objects of systematic police harassment and intimidation. At the same time, however, the arrested Ursus and Radom

8. *Dissent in Poland 1976-77*, London, Association of Polish Students and Graduates in Exile, 1977, pp. 123-37.

9. For a comprehensive collection of KOR documents in English translation, see *Dissent in Poland 1976-77*.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-37.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-64.



*Hunger strikers at St. Martin's Church in Warsaw in May 1977, protesting the arrest of six members of the Committee for Defense of the Workers (KOR) and of four KOR supporters earlier in the month. With the demonstrators is Tadeusz Mazowiecki (front row center, in the light-colored topcoat), Editor-in-Chief of the Catholic monthly Wiez, who acted as liaison between Polish authorities and the strikers.*

—Photo provided by arrangement of the author.

workers were being quietly released one by one. By the spring of 1977, only five of them still remained in prison.

This uneasy standoff broke down after May 7, 1977, when Stanislaw Pyjas, a Krakow student and an active KOR supporter, was found dead. His fellow students reacted swiftly to what they took to be a political assassination (although it is doubtful that his death was in fact a premeditated action). Solemn requiem masses were celebrated in all the university cities in Poland. On May 15, some 2,000 Krakow students staged a candlelight procession through the city. Tension was high, and it was feared that clashes between students and police might ensue, sparking an open revolt. At that moment, six key members of KOR, as well as four KOR supporters, were arrested and accused of cooperation with anticommunist centers in the West. The arrests produced a new wave of protests. At the end of May, 11 persons held a hunger strike in St. Martin's Church in Warsaw. An appeal for the release of the KOR members, characterizing them "not as criminals,

but as dedicated social activists," was issued by 17 prominent writers, scholars, and artists.<sup>12</sup> Under mounting popular pressure, the Communist government relented. On July 23, all of the prisoners—the KOR members and supporters, as well as the remaining five workers—were set free.<sup>13</sup>

KOR has, since September 29, 1977, gone under the expanded name of Committee for Social Self-Defense—KOR (KSS-KOR), although its composition and its structure have remained basically unchanged. Now constituted as a permanent body, KSS-KOR has expanded its goals from the defense of persecuted workers to more general combating of violations of the law, fighting for institutional guarantees of civil rights, and assisting in all similar social initiatives.<sup>14</sup>

12. *Kultura* (Paris), June 1977, p. 142.

13. An interesting account of the developments in Poland in 1977, with special attention to the activities of the opposition, is presented in Peter Osnos, "The Polish Road to Communism," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), October 1977, pp. 209-20.

14. These were reported in *Kultura*, November 1977, pp. 144-45.

## The Opposition in Poland

The achievements of KOR went beyond rallying a great number of people in defense of the persecuted workers and, through popular pressure, compelling the Communist government to abandon its reprisals. Perhaps even more important were the psychological consequences of this achievement. The Committee demonstrated that there is room in contemporary Poland for successful political action. By standing up to the Communist authorities, KOR overcame the political inertia among various segments of Polish society, and its example led to a proliferation of similar activities in many other spheres of life.

### Proliferation of Opposition Groups

On March 25, 1977, the founding of a new group, called the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO) was announced. Its 18 founding members were predominantly from Warsaw and Lodz. The most visible among them was Leszek Moczulski, a former journalist and historian of World War II, who is now in his mid-40's. For the most part, however, ROPCiO, like KOR, is composed of distinctly separate prewar and postwar generations. Among its older members are a prewar general, Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz, and a leader of the former Christian Democratic party, Stefan Kaczorowski. The younger members are mostly former participants in the clandestine group Ruch. The best known of the latter is Andrzej Czuma, who in the spring of 1978 pushed Moczulski aside and emerged as the leading personality in ROPCiO.

In contrast to KSS-KOR, the Movement has no Marxist leanings; if anything, it has reverted to the political traditions of interwar Poland. It is more critical of the Communist system and is more far-reaching in its proposals for political change. The objectives of ROPCiO, as defined in its initial manifesto,<sup>15</sup> are to fight for respect for human and civil rights, to assist persons whose rights have been infringed upon, to publicize violations of the laws, and to strive for institutional safeguards of basic freedoms.

To promote these ends, the Movement has established offices in 11 Polish cities, where free advice is offered to citizens aggrieved by the Communist authorities. By the fall of 1977, they had a current docket of 43 such complaints. ROPCiO's organ is a *samizdat* monthly, *Opinia* (Opinion). In addition to publicizing the Movement's program and activities,



Diverse elements of Polish society gather for the September 1976 funeral of General Roman Abraham (the last commander of the Polish cavalry) in Wrzesnia: at the top, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, the Primate of the Catholic church in Poland, officiates at the funeral; at the center, in the prewar military uniform (with high collar and braided sleeve cuffs), General Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz, who the following spring became a founding member of the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO); at bottom, in the center, Leszek Moczulski, a former journalist and historian of World War II, a prominent founding member of ROPCiO.

15. See *Dissent in Poland 1976-77*, pp. 182-85.

—Photos provided by arrangement of the author.

the paper covers current domestic and international events quite extensively.<sup>16</sup> On June 5, 1977, ROPCiO sponsored the first reunion of former political prisoners, and on August 6 it organized a patriotic demonstration by the grave of prewar Polish Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly. On December 30, an *Opinia* correspondent tried unsuccessfully to attend the Warsaw press conference of US President Jimmy Carter.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to KSS-KOR and ROPCiO, various other groups and *samizdat* publications representing a wide diversity of opinion have appeared in Poland in the last year. About the same time that ROPCiO was set up, a Polish chapter of Amnesty International was founded, with some overlapping of key personalities. In the fall of 1977, the Polish Committee for the Defense of Life and Family was formed. It soon collected over 6,000 signatures on an appeal to parliament to abolish the existing, extremely liberal abortion laws.<sup>18</sup> In the spring of 1978, it came out with its own publication, *Samoobrona Polska* (The Polish Self-Defense), in which, in addition to continuing its antiabortion campaign, it openly reverted to the political tradition of prewar National Democracy. In the summer of 1978, Moczulski and some of his followers, after leaving ROPCiO, established a new monthly, *Droga* (The Road).

At the time of the demonstrations in Krakow in May 1977 the Students' Solidarity Committee (SKS) spontaneously came into existence. Its declared objective is to replace the Communist-dominated student organization with a body that truly represents the Polish students. SKS now has branches at virtually every university in the country and publishes two papers, *Bratniak* (Fraternity) and *Indeks* (Index). In the autumn of 1977, an independent journal of young Catholics, *Spotkania* (Encounters),<sup>19</sup> covering religious as well as social and political topics, was founded. In the autumn of 1977, the first issue of *Robotnik* (The Worker), a publication whose name was borrowed from the respected organ of the old Polish Peasant Party (PPS), appeared. It pledged to strive for replacement of the official

trade unions with genuine workers' representation. This journal was soon followed by *Gospodarz* (The Farmer), addressed to the peasants and urging them to continue their opposition to collectivization of agriculture. Meanwhile, two literary *samizdat* periodicals, *Zapis* (The Record)<sup>20</sup> and *Puls* (Pulse), entered into circulation. Both were of exceptionally good quality, with the latter even including photographs and drawings. *Zapis* was issued by NOWA (Independent Publishing House), which at the same time announced that it intended to undertake publication of books banned by censorship. By the spring of 1978, 13 such volumes, six in belles-lettres and seven in the social sciences, had come out.

Side by side with these open opposition groups, various clandestine groups have continued to function or have started up in Poland in the last two years. For example, the Polish Coalition for Independence has continued to publish critical, often quite penetrating, analyses of various aspects of life in Poland, such as official discrimination against the Catholic church, lack of popular respect for the law, widespread corruption among the ruling elite, and apathy among the people. To oppose these negative phenomena, the PPN has prepared several practical guides to action which outline, for instance, how to cope with the security police and how to collect true information about the situation in the country.<sup>21</sup> In the fall of 1977, another clandestine group gave evidence of its existence with the first issue of a bimonthly, *Polska Walczaca* (Fighting Poland), whose name, significantly, was a cryptonym used for the Polish wartime underground. On October 20, 1977, a Declaration of the Democratic Movement, signed by 110 people, was published in still another *samizdat* paper, *Glos* (The Voice). The declaration observed with satisfaction that in the preceding two years Communist attempts to break the Movement had not only failed but had in fact made it even more popular, to the point that it now had "thousands" of adherents. The time had come, the declaration stated, for the Democratic Movement to undertake the struggle for Poland's democracy and sovereignty.<sup>22</sup>

Along with the flourishing of *samizdat* publications came a proliferation of discussion groups of all sorts, especially among the young people. Some of them have been sponsored by KSS-KOR, ROPCiO,

16. The first four issues of *Opinia* were republished in book form in the West: *Opinia, Pismo ruchu obrony praw człowieka i obywatela, Numery 1-4* (Opinion, Organ of the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights, Nos. 1-4), London, Polonia Book Fund, 1977.

17. See *Opinia* (Warsaw), No. 9, January 1978, and *The New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1978.

18. *Samoobrona Polska* (Warsaw), mimeographed, April 1978, p. 11.

19. The first two issues of this journal were published in book form: *Spotkania: niezależne pismo młodych katolików* (Encounters: Independent Organ of the Young Catholics) [Lublin, Nos. 1-2, October 1977-January 1978], Great Britain, n.p., n.d.

20. The first two volumes, *Zapis I* [May 1977] and *Zapis II* (October 1977), were republished by Index on Censorship, London.

21. For the initial program of PPN, see *Dissent in Poland 1976-77*, pp. 165-70.

22. Reprinted in *Kultura*, December 1977, pp. 138-41.

## The Opposition in Poland

or the SKS, while others have sprung up quite spontaneously. They have met in private homes and also, occasionally, on local church premises. In Warsaw and in some other major cities, veritable intellectual salons have emerged, where prominent writers read their works and well-known scholars give lectures.

### The Flying University

In November 1977, at the initiative of the students' committees, an effort was made to transform some of these occasional lectures into systematic courses. The aim was to supplement the education offered at regular universities, especially in those fields where Communist ideology had placed political limitations on objective scholarship—i.e., in modern history, literature, philosophy, and the social sciences. This new venture has been designated the "Flying University" (UL), after a similar institution in Warsaw at the turn of the century that had played an important role in rekindling national consciousness among Polish students attending Russianized schools by giving secret training in native history and literature. Unlike its distinguished predecessor, the present Flying University is an open institution. It is sponsored by the Society for Educational Courses (TKN), which was founded on January 22, 1978, and is composed of 61 persons, including many prominent writers and scholars. To supervise the quality of courses offered at the UL, the Society established from among its members an Education Council.<sup>23</sup>

In the first trimester (or set of lectures), the Flying University offered five courses on an experimental basis, but by the third trimester, that number had risen to 13. These lectures took place in Warsaw as well as in other major university cities. Although the UL offers no diplomas, its courses have proved to be quite popular. Attendance has averaged 30–40 students but has run as high as 100 for lectures such as Polish postwar history. As an aid to students, "flying libraries" of books banned from the regular university collections have been established. To cap things off, a Free Association of Research and Studies was founded in the spring of 1978. Composed of scholars who have been prevented from working at official institutions, it seeks to foster research free of political influence and to disseminate the results in the form of *samizdat* publications.

23. Ibid., March 1978, pp. 86-87.

The Communist authorities have charged that the objectives of the Flying University are not educational but political, that its main aim is to spread opposition ideas among the young people. Consequently, the authorities have tried hard to restrict the scope of UL activities. Students participating in the courses have been warned by regular university officials about possible adverse consequences for them, and some SKS activists have been interrogated by the police. Several lectures, especially outside of Warsaw, have actually been broken up. Moreover, a few younger lecturers have been arrested and detained long enough to prevent them from meeting their classes. Owners of apartments where lectures have been taking place have been fined for holding "illegal gatherings," and some have even been threatened with eviction from their dwellings.

Since late winter, as the activities of UL have expanded, the scope of official pressure has visibly intensified. Nevertheless, the lectures have continued, and in June 1978 the Flying University completed its first "academic year."

### Debate Over the Opposition Program

Since the opposition has been divided into several groups, and since there have also been internal differences within each of them, no single political platform exists to which all adhere.<sup>24</sup> This does not appear to trouble many in the opposition. As Jacek Kuron has observed, they feel that the time is not as yet ripe for the adoption of a unified opposition program. Rather, what is needed at present is the open airing of various tentative proposals.<sup>25</sup> ROPCiO's monthly *Opinia* voiced a similar sentiment in a June 1977 editorial. While a single opposition movement would appear better suited to fight a one-party dictatorship, the article observed, a pluralistic society could only emerge from below, through the exercise of pluralism in the ranks of the opposition. The result of this situation has been a broad public discussion, with a veritable flood of articles and pam-

24. For a general, but cautious, review of the aims of the opposition by a close Polish observer see Andrzej Szczypiorski, "The Dissidents and Reality," *Europa Archiv* (Bonn), No. 6, 1978. Overlapping and differing objectives have not prevented opposition groups from cooperating with one another. Thus, in mid-1977, ROPCiO strongly protested against the arrests of KOR members; and in the autumn, KSS-KOR members denounced intensified regime harassment of ROPCiO supporters.

25. Jacek Kuron, "Thoughts on the Program of Action," loc. cit. p. 198.

phlets on the country's external as well as domestic situation appearing in *samizdat* form in Poland or smuggled to the West for publication in the émigré press.<sup>26</sup> As one Polish writer commented, not since World War II "has there been a similar debate about the program of action and the vision of a future Republic."<sup>27</sup>

The debate as a whole has been characterized by a remarkable degree of sobriety. In a political treatise written at the end of 1976, an author using the nom de plume Marek Turbacz set the tone.<sup>28</sup> He observed that "thinking in clear political terms" had "been generally alien to the Polish intellectual tradition" and had not been encouraged by 30 years of totalitarian rule. Then he proceeded to put forward his own argument in a detached and precise, almost scientific fashion. His assessment of Poland's position vis-à-vis the USSR was characterized by cold realism:

*We are not able to free ourselves from the domination of Russia. . . . Poland, which is its most important satellite located on its road to Western Europe, cannot regain sovereignty as long as the Russian Empire exists. Neither will the Russian leaders permit Poland . . . to discard the Communist system. This would restrict their influence over us, and also set a dangerous example for the other satellites as well as for their own people.*

*The restoration of Poland's sovereignty and a basic change of the present system would be possible only if preceded by a fundamental change in Russia itself, or a drastic shift in the constellation of forces in the world at large. For this we may have to wait as long as a quarter of a century.*

Soviet domination of Poland, in Turbacz's opinion, determines the limits of viable change in the country. Moscow is likely to intervene should strong anti-Russian sentiments surface among the Polish people; should the PUWP be removed from power and a multiparty system be restored; or should a major reorientation in the country's foreign policy take place. Therefore, the opposition should not promote such developments.

At the same time, Turbacz maintained, the fact that Poland cannot free itself from the USSR's domination does not mean that the Poles should passively resign themselves to their fate and await changes in the international sphere. "There is an essential difference," he pointed out, "between compromise and blind submission, as there is a distinction between a realist policy and collaboration." Within the

existing framework, he argued, there still exists room for the Poles to try to improve their position. There are various domestic changes which the Polish Communist government could undertake without invoking the wrath of Moscow. It could carry out substantial economic reform, expand the role of self-government, enhance the role of experts in the administration, improve the quality of information, and broaden the scope of cultural freedom. These measures would significantly reduce the gap between the Communist authorities and the Polish people, and in this way diminish the danger of repeated violent confrontations between them.

In Turbacz's judgment, however, the Gierek regime is not able to undertake such reforms; and the possibility that some other Communist leader will emerge in the near future who would be willing to do so is remote. Under such circumstances "changes must be extracted from the government through popular pressure." This pressure should not be exerted through sporadic outbursts, but should take the form of a long-term systematic campaign. The opposition, in the author's words, should not incite "revolutionary upheavals, but rather promote everyday demonstrations of civic courage."

Adam Michnik, during his stay in the West in late 1976, outlined an opposition strategy in terms similar to those of Turbacz. Among the changes in Poland which he proposed, and which, in his opinion, would not be incompatible with the Communist system, were: the establishment of independent trade unions; the easing, but not necessarily the complete abolition, of press censorship; the granting of freedom to youth organizations; and the ending of all religious discrimination. Michnik, too, felt quite strongly that popular pressure aimed at extracting reforms from the Communist government should be considerably intensified. He recognized that this might lead to Soviet intervention, but he dismissed the possibility as remote. Soviet military intervention, he argued, would be catastrophic for the present regime; consequently, the Polish Communists would try to avoid

26. This discussion had been heralded by several interesting programmatic statements written during the first part of the 1970's. Perhaps the most significant among them was that by Marian Kowalski, "The Need for a Program," *Kultura*, May 1975. Also in 1975 there appeared (largely unnoticed in the West) an excellent study of communism in Poland by Marek Tarniewski, *Ewolucja czy rewolucja* (Evolution or Revolution), Paris, Institut Littéraire, 1975.

27. Socjusz, "Political Activities and Programs," *Kultura*, September 1977, p. 31.

28. Marek Turbacz, "Possibilities for Opposition Activities in Poland," *Aneks*, No. 16-17, 1977, pp. 3-46.

## The Opposition in Poland

it at any cost. Moreover, since it would be highly detrimental to East-West détente, Moscow would be extremely reluctant to take such a step.<sup>29</sup>

After his return home, Michnik emphatically reiterated these moderate views in a statement he made early in 1978. "We don't want to overthrow the system," he declared. Then he added:

*We realize that in Poland today the Communist party must rule, and that Poland must stay in the Soviet bloc—we just want them to rule more justly. We want a dialogue with the party, not a clash. . . .<sup>30</sup>*

Jacek Kuron, in a programmatic essay written toward the end of 1976, also disavowed any intentions on the part of the opposition to seek a confrontation with the government. He claimed that the opposition, on the contrary, is striving to promote peace in Poland. Soviet intervention, he argued, is more likely to be brought about by popular upheaval over some drastic government measures than by moderate reforms, which are the most effective way to pacify the Polish people.<sup>31</sup>

Not all of the statements in the *samizdat* publications, however, have been quite so reasonable as those just cited. Some have clearly gone beyond the limits which Turbacz warned the opposition not to transgress. Writing in the student paper *Bratniak*, Tomasz Mroz declared himself in favor of primacy of moral over political concepts. He rejected as naive the belief in the possibility of a compromise with despotic rulers and called for a struggle by the opposition conceived "as a moral necessity to fight against evil in political life." He argued, furthermore, that the acceptance of limited reforms would imply "the abandonment of maximum demands, and one must always keep in mind the ultimate goal. . . . a free and independent Poland."<sup>32</sup>

Similarly, *Opinia*, the organ of ROPCIO, has taken an increasingly militant stance. The editorial article in its March 1978 issue held that either one is in favor of the Communist system and Poland's subordination to the USSR, or one stands for democracy and independence. "A middle ground," the article concluded, "no longer exists."<sup>33</sup>

The Polish Coalition for Independence, in some

of its statements, has also adopted fairly extreme positions. In the spring of 1977, it came out with an eloquent, but highly emotional, statement defending the anti-Russian insurrectionist tradition in Poland. "It is owing to the conspiracies, insurrections, and the resistance movements," it exclaimed, "that today we are a nation." Although the PPN declaration stopped short of actually calling on the Poles to rise to arms, it implored them to persist in the struggle for independence.<sup>34</sup>

The PPN's program was criticized by a writer using the pseudonym of Marek Brzost. He characterized it as noble but utopian, since it did not point to a practical way of regaining the country's independence. Resistance without the chance of winning would only result in unnecessary losses. Dictatorships "can be overcome, but it takes more than moral and intellectual forces to accomplish this." And in the present situation of Poland, Brzost concluded, "the time is not ripe to. . . resort to open resistance."<sup>35</sup>

The leaders of the main groups of the Polish opposition evidently agreed with Brzost, for at a meeting in the spring of 1978 they categorically repudiated conspiratorial and insurrectionist tactics and opted to continue open and peaceful activities. Their declaration on that occasion stated unequivocally that members of the democratic opposition "will not let themselves be driven into conspiracy, they will not be provoked and will never resort to acts of terror, which could be exploited to liquidate any authentic, spontaneously formed outlets of social initiatives."<sup>36</sup>

## The New Opposition Tactics

As Adam Michnik has pointed out in a lecture delivered in Paris, the year 1976 represented a turning point in the tactics of the opposition in Poland. Until that time, and even during the confrontation over the constitutional amendments, opposition appeals had been primarily addressed to the Communist authorities. The opposition assumed that changes would come "from above." That is, the opposition "counted on the positive evolution of the [Communist] party due to the enlightened policies

29. Adam Michnik, "Poland Lives," *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 16, 1976.

30. Cited in Nicolas Carroll, "Communism in kid gloves for a state where most people are dissidents," *The Sunday Times* (London), Apr. 9, 1978.

31. "Thoughts on the Program of Action," loc. cit., pp. 208-09.

32. "Why Protest?" *Bratniak*, November 1977.

33. "The Problem of Democracy," *Opinia*, March 1978, p. 6.

34. "The Polish Homeland—The Independence Tradition and Its Enemies," *Tydzień Polski* (London), Apr. 23, 1977.

35. "Some Remarks about the PPN Program," *Kultura*, November 1976, pp. 105-06.

36. Reported by Alexander Smolar in his article "Poland: 10 years After," *The Times* (London), Apr. 17, 1978.



*The prison in Radom where workers who participated in the spontaneous June 1976 demonstrations in that Polish town were held. Efforts to demand humane treatment and release of these workers were important in the subsequent emergence of a variety of new opposition groups in Poland.*

—Photo provided by arrangement of the author.

of its leaders, while it abstained from pushing them in this direction through organized and persistent social pressure." With the establishment of KOR, opposition tactics changed. Appeals were now directed at the people, with the aim of generating changes "from below."<sup>37</sup>

An example is the opposition's new role as "public ombudsman." KOR's campaign on behalf of the imprisoned workers from Radom and Ursus helped them regain their freedom. Since that time, both KSS-KOR and ROPCiO have been systematically collecting and publishing information about the police's abuse of power and about the courts' condoning of such practices. In the spring of 1978, KSS-KOR issued a White Paper describing in some detail 25 cases in which police officers had violated the law. The document emphasized that this evidence represented only the tip of the iceberg and that many more such instances were known to the Committee.<sup>38</sup>

37. Adam Michnik, "A Strategy for the Polish Opposition," in *La Pologne: une société en dissidence* (Poland: A Society in Dissidence), Paris, Maspero, 1978, p. 100. See also Jan Gross, "Political Opposition in Poland," *Aneks*, No. 15, 1977.

Another role which the opposition groups have played is to exert pressure on various branches of the administration by publicly criticizing their practices. A special column in *Opinia* has regularly scrutinized the shortcomings of economic policies in a highly competent manner, and in the spring of 1978 KSS-KOR came out with a comprehensive pamphlet exposing the grave economic situation in the country.<sup>39</sup> *Gospodarz* has pointed out the inadequacies of the newly introduced pension plan for private farm owners; and *Robotnik* has reported on the waste and inefficiency prevailing in some factories.

All of the *samizdat* publications have mercilessly attacked the censorship of the official press. They were provided with a golden opportunity in the spring of 1977 by the defection to the West of Tomasz Strzyzewski, an employee of the censorship office in Krakow. Strzyzewski took with him substantial

38. *Dokumenty bezprawia* (Documents of Lawlessness), Warsaw, NOWA, mimeographed, Apr. 7, 1978.

39. *Uwagi o sytuacji gospodarczej kraju* (Remarks about the Country's Economic Situation), Warsaw, NOWA, mimeographed, 1978.

confidential evidence about the inner workings of censorship in Poland. These documents, which amount to a devastating criticism of the entire system, were also made available to KSS-KOR and have been systematically reprinted by the opposition press.<sup>40</sup>

Finally, the *samizdat* papers have increasingly taken direct issue with authors publishing in the official press, and have also come out with critiques, at times harsh, of specific plays, television shows, and films. In a fairly close-knit intellectual milieu such as exists in Poland, challenges of this kind tend to put strong pressure on the writers, scholars, and artists to improve their performances, if only to avoid public ridicule. Faced with such pressure, the intellectuals, in turn, are more likely to oppose interference with their works by the censorship authorities. The meeting of the Polish Writers' Union held in Katowice on April 7-8, 1978, affords a good illustration. Union members decisively repudiated crude Communist efforts to intervene in the union's affairs and, in fact, elected to the union's Executive several persons prominently linked with opposition activities.<sup>41</sup>

Although various *samizdat* papers reminded their readers on the occasion of the February 1978 local government elections that under Polish electoral law, they could abstain from voting or cross out names of candidates who do not merit their confidence, this was just a trial balloon. The opposition is clearly not prepared to test the Communist party in an electoral battle. For the present, as one of the editors of *Głos*, using the nom de plume Marek Tarniewski, argued, "for anybody outside of the [Communist] party to try to win power would be premature." For the time being, he wrote, the opposition should concentrate on rebuilding an "authentic" social life, "independent of the government."<sup>42</sup>

Turbacz, in the essay cited above, summarized the present, restricted, political goals of the Polish opposition as the creation of an unofficial national culture, and, above all, the development of Polish political thought free from the influence of Com-

munism ideology. This, he wrote, should lead to the rise of new cultural and political elites.<sup>43</sup> The existence in Poland of manifold *samizdat* publications, the ongoing debate in their pages about the opposition program, and the activities of various discussion groups and the Flying University suggest that these goals are well on the way to being realized.

### An Uneasy Stalemate

Relations between the Communist government and the democratic opposition, as Antoni Macierewicz has observed, are currently stalemated. The opposition is unable to extract democratic reforms from the government, and the government is unable to prevent the opposition from trying to do so.<sup>44</sup> However, the fact that the activities of the various opposition groups are tolerated for the time being does not mean that their continued existence has been accepted by the Gierek regime. Short of a frontal attack, the Communist authorities are doing whatever they can to restrict, or at least to make as difficult as possible, opposition activities. The police keep close watch over all the groups. Between September 1976 and October 1977, there were at least 318 house searches, and about 1,000 people were arrested and interrogated.<sup>45</sup> Since early 1978, the intensity of police persecution, especially outside Warsaw, has, if anything, increased.

For the moment, the government can afford to tolerate opposition activities because they do not pose an imminent threat. The opposition has exerted influence basically among the intelligentsia, gaining only scattered support from the workers.<sup>46</sup> Two attempts to organize a free trade union movement—the first in Katowice in February 1978 and the second in Gdansk the following April—were confined to a handful of individuals and were both met with immediate and severe reprisals.<sup>47</sup>

Official propaganda tries to minimize the significance of the opposition groups still further by depicting them as a small bunch of extremists virtually isolated from the Polish people. In a statement for

40. The first volume of the documents revealed by Strzyzowski has already been published in the West, and the second volume is soon to follow. See *Czarna księga cenzury PRL* (The Black Book on Censorship in the People's Republic of Poland), London, Aneks, 1977.

41. *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), Apr. 10, 1978, listed the members of the new Executive.

42. Marek Tarniewski, *Działanie i przyszłość* (Action and the Future), London, Odnowa, 1977, pp. 26, 29.

43. "Possibilities for Opposition Activities in Poland," loc. cit., pp. 22-23.

44. Antoni Macierewicz, "Legality," *Głos*, March 1978, p. 5.

45. Bogdan Borusewicz, "The Methods of Fighting the Opposition in Poland," *Spotkania*, October 1977.

46. Janusz Topacz, "What Is It All About?" *ibid.*

47. A writer from Poland has compared the position of the working class in the stalemate between the opposition and the government to the role of nuclear weapons in East-West relations. Should either of the principals reach for it, the other would respond with everything that it has. See Jan Kowal, "The Nature of the Ferment in the Country," *Trybuna* (London), No. 28, 1978.



200,000 Catholic pilgrims assemble at the Polish town of Czestochowa on August 15, 1977, for the annual observances at the shrine of the Black Virgin.

—R. Darolle/SYGMA.

the foreign press, a government spokesman, Miroslaw Wojciechowski, estimated the strength of the opposition in Poland at some 100 hard-core members and about 1,000 sympathizers. The rest, he maintained, are people who will listen to the opposition arguments but who would not themselves get involved in its activities.<sup>48</sup>

Wojciechowski also categorically rejected the possibility of the Communist authorities' entering into dialogue with the opposition. However, he did express the hope that at least some members of the opposition would perceive the unrealistic nature of their present course and avail themselves of the opportunities, which he claimed exist but are not fully utilized, to develop socialist democracy in the country. As to those people who would continue along their present road, Wojciechowski warned,

there would be no need for wholesale repression, but selective reprisals against them would be used and might even be intensified in the future.

This official picture is all too sanguine. In reality, the strength of the opposition is considerably greater than Wojciechowski's estimate. There are at present in Poland at least 20 *samizdat* papers published regularly, with a total monthly circulation of no less than 20,000.<sup>49</sup> To write, edit, publish, and distribute them must take at least several hundred persons, with a protective network of sympathizers around them of several thousand people. Since each copy of a *samizdat* publication is usually passed around among several persons, it is probably no exaggeration to estimate that they reach some 100,000

48. From an interview on West German television, reported in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Mar. 11, 1978.

49. It is estimated by opposition circles that by early 1978 close to 100,000 copies of *samizdat* papers and books had been issued. As of the spring of 1978, the circulation of *Robotnik* was 15,000; that of *Opinia*, 8,000; and that of *Glos*, 2,000. See Stefan Kawalec, "The Traditions of Political Action," *Glos*, March 1978.

readers, even if one takes into account the confiscation of some copies.<sup>50</sup> The scope of opposition activities, then, is quite substantial, and to try to break the opposition would require a massive police action.

Resorting to mass terror would have disastrous political consequences for the Gierek regime. It would intensify the alienation of intellectuals from the Communist government and would lead to a new rupture in relations with the Catholic church. Furthermore, it would also adversely affect Poland's external relations, especially its trade with the West. The disruption of this trade is something which the country, in its present precarious economic situation can ill afford, for any further deterioration of the standard of living could lead to what Gierek fears the most—namely, new unrest among the workers. Finally, use of mass terror would in all probability revive factional struggle within the PUWP itself.

It is very doubtful that Gierek could weather such a political storm. In this respect, the opposition's assumption that he will refrain from wholesale terror at all cost seems to be quite correct.

Thus, as long as the democratic opposition maintains its present course of abstaining from conspiratorial and revolutionary tactics, there is little danger that it will provoke wholesale Communist efforts to repress it. But persistent refusal on the part of the Communist regime to recognize the opposition's existence could aggravate the opposition's radical tendencies. In fact, the government has already contributed in one way to such a development. By firing more than a hundred young men and women from their jobs for political reasons, the Communist authorities have, in effect, created a full-time cadre of opposition activists.

Moreover, one important factor that has contributed to the moderate course of the Polish opposition—the close relationship of its younger leaders to the older intelligentsia in its ranks—may not continue to prevail forever. So far, more experienced hands have helped the younger oppositionists appreciate the harsh realities of Poland's international position. Yet the structure of both KSS-KOR and ROPCiO is such that the initiative rests increasingly not with the older but with the younger members, who are

50. In a lecture given on Apr. 20, 1978, Teodor Palimaka, head of the Administration Division in the PUWP Secretariat, claimed that out of 20,000 copies of *samizdat* publications about one half are intercepted by the security police. *Zagadnienia z zakresu dalszego umacniania ładu, porządku i dyscypliny społecznej* (Problems Relating to Further Strengthening of Peace, Order, and Social Discipline), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, May 1978, p. 18.

often quite young indeed. In Polish history, there have been instances where such an imbalance ended in catastrophe. For example, the ill-fated anti-Russian insurrections of 1830 and 1863 were both started by young hotheads against the better advice of their elders.

The semiclandestine environment in which the opposition is compelled to operate and the subtle but unmistakable police persecution to which it is constantly exposed are also not helpful to its perseverance on a moderate course. Petty police harassment, while totally ineffective in substance, adds to an atmosphere charged with emotion. Furthermore, being compelled to remain at the margin of open political life introduces an element of the unreal into the opposition's activities. Its leaders compensate by occasional outbursts of grandeur, as when Moczulski claimed that it is the Communist party that finds itself in a state of seige,<sup>51</sup> or when Kuron declared that it is the opposition that tolerates the government and not vice versa (a statement that he later retracted).<sup>52</sup>

Last but not least, there is the danger that, in competing for popular support, the different opposition groups may seek to outbid one another by demonstrating their radicalism. Indeed, the increasingly militant tone of some *samizdat* publications indicates that this already may be beginning to happen. Yet, from the government's standpoint, intensified repressions would only enhance this tendency by pushing various opposition groups even deeper into the underground.

To sum up, then, the opposition appears to be pursuing a "calculated risk" strategy that rests on two assumptions. First, it anticipates that at some critical moment the Communist government would offer far-reaching concessions to the Polish people rather than risk Soviet military intervention. This assumption may well be valid with regard to the Gierek regime, which appears to understand that in the event of any political crisis of major proportions it would be swept from power. Yet there clearly are groups within the PUWP that would not be averse to, and might even welcome, direct Soviet involvement. As one Polish writer put it,

...there are people in the party who are looking forward to the confrontation—either because they

51. Leszek Moczulski, "The Last Stand," *Opinia*, October 1977. Quoted from *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD 255, Dec. 23, 1977.

52. Jacek Kuron, "An Accord Is Possible Between Polish Opinion and the USSR," *Le Monde*, Mar. 1, 1977.

believe that for a long time now the people have deserved a severe lesson in obedience, or because Moscow, the wiser for its experiences [of 1968] in Prague, may designate them as the leaders of the next, and this time carefully prepared in advance, new "government" of Poland.<sup>53</sup>

Radicalization of opposition programs, then, would only play into the hands of these Communist hardliners.

The second assumption underlying the opposition strategy is that in a climate of East-West détente the Soviet Union would be reluctant to intervene with force in Poland. This assumption is also probably accurate. The Soviet leaders seem to be well aware of the grave consequences such a step would produce for them in the international sphere. In the existing, strained state of East-West relations, it

might well spell the end of détente. In order to avoid this risk, Moscow would probably accept substantial reforms in the present system in Poland as long as they were carried out in an orderly fashion and under the aegis of the PUWP. Yet, as Turbacz rightly observed, there are limits to Soviet toleration. And not only has the gap between the political situation in Poland and that in the other countries of Eastern Europe—not to mention the USSR itself—become quite extensive, but it also seems to be widening.<sup>54</sup>

Poland's present situation, then, rests on a delicate equilibrium among many competing forces. Failure on the part of any of these forces to exercise great caution could upset that equilibrium. For Gierek, or his successor, that will probably entail curbing the hardliners in the Communist ranks and offering tangible improvements to the Polish people. To produce such improvements, he may well have to expand the outside limits of Poland's freedom vis-à-vis the USSR, possibly even by standing up to the Russians. For the opposition, sufficient prudence not to push demands beyond the point of no return will obviously be indispensable. Kuron once commented that in Poland's position it is better to stop one step short than to go one step too far.<sup>55</sup> Will Poles manage to meet the challenge?

53. Leopoldita, "Marginal Comments on the Program," in *Ruch oporu*, p. 238

54. For a comparison of the Polish and Czechoslovakian situations, see the author's "Czechoslovakia 1968—Poland 1978: A Dilemma for Moscow," *International Journal* (Toronto), October 1978; and for an assessment of the situation of the dissidents in the USSR, see his "Human Rights and Détente," *International Perspectives* (Ottawa), June-July 1978.

55. Jacek Kuron, "Thoughts on the Program of Action," loc. cit., p. 208.

# Books

## Urbanization and Urban Planning Under Socialism

By John W. Dyckman and Jack C. Fisher

N. A. MILYUTIN. *Sotsgorod: The Problem of Building Socialist Cities*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1974.

MICHAEL F. HAMM, Ed. *The City in Russian History*. Lexington, KY, University Press of Kentucky, 1976.

ALAN A. BROWN et al., Eds. *Urban and Social Economics in Market and Planned Economies*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1974. 2 Vols.

KAREL JOSEPH KANSKY. *Urbanization Under Socialism: The Case of Czechoslovakia*. New York, NY, Praeger, 1976.

"CIVILIZATION has left us the legacy of huge cities, and to get rid of them will cost us much in time and effort, but it will be necessary to get rid of them, and this will be done." Such was the conclusion of Friedrich Engels as he assessed the impact of the city on human development.<sup>1</sup> The evidence presented in the works under review here, however, demonstrates not only how great

such an effort would have been, but also how inconstant socialist planners have been in the pursuit of Engels' goal. Far from eliminating huge cities, socialist urban planners have struggled simply to contain them, and even this not always successfully. For the dynamics of urban growth are complex and imperfectly understood, with spatial solutions to problems the result of a combination of a large number of economic, political, geographical, and social forces and motivations. Moreover, a city's history may generate its own inertial forces. Hans Blumenfeld, one of the German urban planners who went to work for a time in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution, subsequently argued that such inertial forces are particularly strong after a city has attained a population size of half a million—i.e., that once that size has been reached, cities generate from their size new dynamics that serve to maintain or increase growth.

Under such conditions, putting an end to urban development could hardly be considered a

routine task. Yet Marx and Engels bequeathed very little in the way of a specific urban program to their successors. The most specific objective which emerges from their writings is the well-known "abolition of the distinction between town and country" postulated in the Communist Manifesto. Engels developed the theme in his essay on *The Housing Question*, arguing that

*There is no sense in trying to solve the housing question by trying to preserve our big cities. The elimination of the difference between the city and the country is no more nor less utopian than the elimination of the difference between the capitalist and the hired worker.<sup>2</sup>*

He advocated as uniform a distribution of activities as possible over the whole country, with an integral connection of industrial and agricultural production and extension of the means of communication. Lenin's Rural Electrification Program was advanced

1. Cited in N. A. Milyutin, *Sotsgorod*, p. 61.

2. Quoted in ibid., p. 60.